In previous work [BGHK92, BGHK93], we have studied the random-worlds approach�a particular (and quite powerful) method for generating degrees of belief (i.e., subjective probabilities) from a knowl edge base consisting of objective (first-order, slalisti cal, and defaull) infonnation. But allowing a knowl edge base to contain only objective information is sometimes limiting. We occa<; ionally wish to include infonnation about degrees of belief in the knowledge base as well, because there are contexts in which old be1iefs represent important information that should influence new beliefs. In this paper, we describe three quite general techniques for extending a method that generates degrees of belief from objective informa tion to one that can make use of degrees of belief as well. All of our techniques are ha<;ed on well-known approaches, such a5 cross-emropy. We discuss gen eral connections between the techniques and in partic ular show that, although conceptually and technically quite different, all of the techniques give the same answer when applied to the random-worlds method.
Introduction
When we examine the knowledge or information possessed by an agent, it is useful to distinguish between subjective and objective information. Objective information is infor mation about me environment, whcrca� su�iective informa tion is infonnation about the state of the agent's hcliefs. For example, we might characterize the infonnation of an agent travelling from San Francisco to New York as con�isting of the objective infonnation tlmt the weather is warm in San Francisco, and the subjecti ve infotmation that the proba bility rhat the weather is wann in New York is 0. 
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Berkeley, CA 94720 daphne@cs.berkeley.edu principle determine if the agent's objective information is cmTect (by examining what is actually the case in its envi ronment), we cannot so ea<;ily say that its subjective beliefs are '-Xmcct. The truth or falsity of these pieces of informa tion is not detcnnined by the state of the environment.
Although su bj ective infonnation could take many differ ent l(mns. we will concentrate here on degrees of belief These arc probabilities that are assigned to fonnulas ex pressing objective assertions. For example, the assertion "the weather is warm in New York" is an objective one: it is either true or false in the agent's environment. But when we <L..;sig n a degree of belief to this assertion, as above, we obtain a subjective a�sertion: it becomes a statement about the state of the agent's beliefs. In tl1e context of probability theory the distinction between subjective and objective can appear somewhat subtle. because some form of objective information (such <L<; proportions or frequencies) obey the laws of probahility,j ust a<; d o degrees of belief. Yet the dis tincrion can be a significant one if we want to use or interpret a pmbahilistic theory conectly. Camap's work [Car50] is notewort11y for its careful distinction between, and study of, both st atistical probabilities, which are objective, and degree of belief probabilities, which are subjective.
In order to understand this distinction, it is useful to pro vide a formal semantics for degrees of belief that captures the difference between them and objective information. As dcmonstraled by Halpern [Hal90], a natural, and very gen eral. way to give a semantics to degrees of belief is by defi ning a probabili ty distribution over a set of possible worlds.1 The degree of belief in a fonnula r.p is then the probability of the set of worlds where r.p is true. In this framework we can characterize o�jective infonnation as consisting of assertions (expressed as fmmulas} that can he assi gned a truth value by a single world. For example, in any given world Tweety the bird does or does not fly.
Hence, the fonnula Fly(Tweety) is objective. Statistical assertions such as IIFly(x)IBird(J:)II'" � 0.8, read "approx imately 80% of birds fly", are also objective. On the other hand, Pr( Fly(Tweety)) = 0.8, expressing the assertion that 1Conceptually. this notion of world is just as in classical ··possibl�-worlds semantics": a complete picture or description of tht! way the world might he. Formally, we take a world to be an intcrprctntion (model) for first-order logic. the agent's degree of belief in Tweety !lying is 0.8, is not objective, as its truth is determined by whether or not tlle probability of the set of worlds where Tweety flies is 0.8.
Although we cannot easily characterize an agent's degrees of beliefs as being correct or incorrect, it is nevertlleless clear that these beliefs should have some relation to objec tive reality. One way of guaranteeing this is to actually generate them from the objective information available to the agent. Several ways of doing this have been consid ered in the literature; for example, [BGHK92, PV92] each discuss several possibilities. The approaches in {BGHK92) are based in a very natural way on tlle semantics described above. Assume we have a (prior) probability distribution over some set of worlds. We cru1 t11en generate degrees of belief from an objective knowledge ba�e KB by u sing standard Bayesian conditioning: to t11e formula 'P we a� sign as its degree of belief the conditional prob ability of r.p given KB. In [BGHK92] we considered three particu lar choices for a prior, and investigated the properties of the resulting inductive inference systems. In [BGHK93] we concentrated on the simplest of these methods-the random-worlds method-whose choice of prior is essen tially the uniform prior over the set of possible worlds.
More precisely, suppose we restrict our attention to worlds (i.e., interpretations of ru1 appropriate vocabulary for first order logic) with t11e domain { I, . . . , N}. Assuming we have a finite vocabulary, there will be only finitely many such worlds. Random worlds takes a'> the set of worlds all of these worlds, and uses perhaps the si mplest probability distribution over them-the uniform distribution�thus as suming that each of t11e worlds is equally likely. This gives a prior distribution on the set of possible worlds. We can now induce a degree of belief in 'P given KB by using the conditional probability of 'P given Kll with respect to this uniform distribution. II is ea-;y to see that the degree of belief in r.p given KB is then simply tJ1e fraction of possible worlds satisfying KB that also satisfy 'P· In general. how ever, we do not know the domain size N; we know only that it is typically large. We cm1 therefore approximate the degree of belief for the true but unknown N by computing the limiting value of this degree of belief as N grows large.
This limiting value (if it exists, which it may not) is denoted �( r.piKB), and it is what the random-world method takes to be the degree of belief in 'P given KB. Pr(S/(:t') 1\ S2(.r")IActual(;r)) = Pr(Sl(:t ' )IActua/(;r)) x Pr(S2(x")IActual(x)). equally likely. This is consistent with the random worlds approach of making all worlds equally likely. Intuitively, we are considering the probability distribution on the worlds that is as close as possible to our original uniform distribu tion subject to the constraint that the set of worlds where
Red( b) holds should have probability 0.8.
What do we do if we have ru1 inference process other than random worlds? As long as it also proceeds by generating a prior on a set of possible worlds and then conditioning, we can deal with at least tl1is example. We simply use the prior generated by the method to ao;; sign relative weights to the worlds in the sets determined hy Red( b) and -.Red( b), and then scale these weights within each set so that the sets are assigned probability 0.8 ru1d 0.2 respectively. (Readers familiar with Jeffrey ' s rule [Jer92] will realize that this is es sentially an application of that rule.) Again, intuitively, we are considering the distribution closest to Ute original prior that gives the set of worlds satisfying Red( b) probability 0.8.
Unfortunately, the knowledge bao;; e is rarely this simple. Our degrees of belief often place comple x constraints on the probability distribution over possihle worlds. Never theless, we would like to maintain the intuition that we are considering the distribution "closest" to the original prior that satisfi es the constnunts imposed by the KB. But how do we determine the "closest" distribution? One way is 
More generally, we might hope that given an inference 
In this case,
etc. As in the simple example, it seems reasonable to take ity distributions over possible worlds, while CEF uses it to compare two probability distributions over formulas. On the other hand, any probability distribution on worlds gen erates a probability distribution on formulas in th e obvious way ( tbe probability of a formula is the probability of the set of worlds where it is true), and so we can use a well-known property of the cross-entropy function to observe that the two approaches are in fact equivalent when they can hmh be applied.
It is worth noting that the two approaches are actua.ll y in comparable in their scope of application. Because CEF is not restricted to inference processes tlJat generate a prior probability on a set of possible worlds, it can be applied to more inference processes than CEW. On the other hand, CEW is applicable to arbitrary KB's while, as we shall see,
for CEF to apply we need to make more restrictions on the form of the KB.
In Ibis paper, we focus on two instantiations of CEF. The first applies it to the random-worlds method. expressions is formed by adding the rational numbers to the set of basic proportion (resp. belief) expressions and then
closing off under addition m1d mu ltiplication.
We compm · e two proportion expressions using the approx imate connective ::5 ("approximately less than or equal");
the result is a proportion formu la. We use { � {' as an abbreviation for ({ ::5 e) 1\ ({' ::5 0· Th us, for example, we can express the statement "90% of birds fly" using the proportion formula IIFly(x)IBird(x)llx � 0.9.4 We com pare two belief expressions using standard �; the result is a basic belief{ormula. the vocabu lary <ll , and Jl is a probability distribution over WN .5 Given a structure and a world in that structure. we evaluate a proportion expression 111/•( :�: ) I O ( . r ) II . ,· as the frac tion of domain elements satisfying 1,1>( ;I' ) among those sat isfying O(x ) . We evaluate a belief formula using our proha bi1ity distribution over tl1e set of possibl e worlds. More pre cisely, given a structure M = (WN, 11), a world wE WN , a tolerance r E (0, I] (used to i n terpret :::: :: : and ::S), and a valuation V (used to inter pret the free variables), we asso ciate with each fo nnula a tru tll value and with each belief expression or proportion expression ( a numher [ (j M, w ,v, r.
We give a few representative clauses here:
• If ( is tlle proportion expression II \0( . 1:) I �{1: ) II,., then
[(]M,w, v,r is the number of domai n elements in w sa tis fying \0 1\ 1/ ; divided hy the numher sat isfy ing '' '· (Note that these n umbers may depend on w . ) We take this fraction to be 1 if no domain elements satisfies · � ·.
• If ( is the belief expression Pr( 'P II /'), then
Again, we take this to he 1 i f the denominator is 0. That is, approximate less than or eq ual allows a tolerance of r.
Notice that if ( is a belief expression, then its value is independent of the world w. -r-0 N -+-CXJ a-; suming the limit exists. P1-: ( cpiKB) is the degree of belief in 'P given KI3 according to the random-worlds method.
Maximum entl'Opy and cross-entropy
The entropy or a probability distribution Jl over a fi nite space n is -LwEn/l(w) ln(,l(w)). It ha� been argued [Jay78] that entropy measures the amount of "information" in a probabi lity distribution, in the sense of information tlleory.
The uniform distribution has the maximum possible en tropy. In general, given some constraints on the probability distributions, the distribution with maximum entropy that satisfies the constrai nts cllil be viewed as the one that incor porates the least additional infonnation above and beyond the constraints.
The related cross-entropy function measures the additional information gained by moving from one distribution Jl to another uistrihution Jl1:
. pw wEn Va rious arguments have been presented showing that cross entropy measures how close one probability distribution is to anot her [S.TRO, Sho86). Thus, given a prior distribution I' and a set S' of addi tional constrai nts, we are typically in terestcu in the unique distribution 1/ tllat satisfi es S and minimizes C(p' , p ). It is well-known tlmt a sufficient con dition for such a unique distribution to exist is that the set of distributions satisfying S form a convex set, and that there be at le<L<;t one distribution p" satisfying S such th at C(IJ'' , I') is fi ni te. These conditions often hold in practice.
3 The three methods
CEW
As we mentioned in the introduction, our first metll od, itively, pf8 is the probability distribution closest to the prior Jli that gives KB probability l. Let Mf8 = (WI,JLf8). We can then define CEW(I)( c.oiKB) = [Pr( cp )J.�1Ks T .
I '
The first thing to observe is that if KB is objective, then standard properties of cross-entropy can he used to show that pf8 is t11e condilional distri bution I'· I Cl KI3 It is interesting to note that the distribution defined by CEW(Prrt\ � ) is the distribution of maximum entropy that satisfies the constraint Pr( KB) = l. 1l1is follows from the observation that the distri bution that minimizes the cross entropy from the uniform distribution among those distri butions sat isfying some constraints S', is exactly the distri bution or maximum entropy satisfying 5. 6 This maximum entropy characterization demonstrates Umt Pr�w extends random worlds by making the probabilities of the possible worlds "<t<; equal as possible" given the constraints.
CEF
Pari s and Vencovska [PV89] consider inferences processes that arc not world-based, so CEW cannot be applied to them. The method CEF we now define applies to arbitrary inference processes. but requires that the knowledge base be or a restri cted form. For the remainder of this section, we assume that the knowledge ba..; e has the fo nn KB 1\ BB,
where KB is an objective fo rm ula and BB (which we call the hclicr base) is in £11"'.
First. suppose for simplicity that BB is of UJe form Pr( th ) = d1 !\ ···A Pr( V-'d = Pk · If U1e t/J; 's were mutually exclu sive, then we could define C E F ( I)( lf'IBB) so that Propo would be to assume that, after conditioning, the a<> sertions 'if;; are independent. But, as we observed in the introduction, assuming independence is inappropriate in general.
Our solution is to first employ cross-entropy to fi nd appro priate probabilities for these atoms. We proceed as follows.
Suppose I is an arbitrary inference process, 1313 E C f1at , and 1/J1 , ... , 1/Jk are the formulas that appear in subexpres sions of the form Pr( 'if;) in BB . We form the K = 2k atoms generated by the 'if;; , denoting them by A 1, ... , AK. Con sider the probability Jl defined on the space of atoms via t-t(Aj ) = I(Aj [KB ) .7 There is an obvious way of defining whether the formula BB is satisfied by a probability distri bution on the atoms A1, . .. , Ak (we defer t11e formal details to the fu ll paper), but in general B B will not be sat isfi ed by the distribution 11. For a simple example, if we take the inference procedure to be random worlds and consider the knowledge base KBb;nJA(Pr(Red(b)) = 0.8) from the intro duction, it turns out that P1-:
Clearly, the distribution 11 such that p. (Red( b)) is around 0.57 does not satisfy t11e constraint Pr(Red( b)) = 0.8. Let
Jl' be the probability distribution over the atoms that mini mizes cross-entropy relative to p among those that satisfy BB, provided tl1ere is a unique such distribution. We then define
It is immediate from the definition that CEF( I) extends /.
Formally, we have Both CEW and CEF use cross-entropy. However, the two applications are quite different. In the cm;e of CEW, we apply cross-en tropy witl1 respect to probabi lity distribu tions over possible worlds, whereas with CEE we apply it to probability distributions over fo rmulas. Nevertheless, as we mentioned in the introduction, there is a tight connection between the approaches, since any probahility distribution over worlds defines a probabil ity distribution over fonn u las. In fact the fo llowing equivalence can be proved, usi ng simple properties of tJJe cross-emropy function.
Theorem 3.4 :
Suppose I is a world-based i�[erence process, KB ,<p E co"i , and BB E [fl•<�. Then CEW(I)(�PIKB A BB) = CEF(/)('P[KB A BB).
Thus, CEF an d CEW agree in contexts where both are defined.
By analogy to tl1e defin ition for CEW, we define The fonn of KB' ensures that U1ere will be a unique distribution llme over Ulese atoms Ulat maxi mizes entropy and satisfies the constraints. We then de fine ME(<p(c) IKB' 1\ Jj;(c)) to be Pme(lf'l1/!). Intuitively, we are choosing the distribution of maximum entropy over the atoms that satisfies KB', and treating c a<; a "nmdom" ele ment of Ule domain, assuming it satisfies each atom over P wiili Ule probability dictated by Jlme · To apply CEF to ME, we also need to put restrictions on tlle belief base. We say that DB E .cJra t is an es· Moreover, ifCEF(ME) ( <p (c) IKB A BB) is defi ned, then CEF(ME) (<p(c) IKB A BB) = Pr�F('-P(c)IKB A BB).
RS
The last method we consider, RS, is based on the intu ition that degree of belief a� sertions must ultimately ari se from statistical statements. This general idea goes hack to work in Ule field of statistical mechanics [LanRO), where it has been applied to the problem of reasoning about the total energy of physical systems. If the system consists of many particles then what is, in essence, a random-worlds analysis can be appropriate. If the energy of the system is known exactly no conceptual problem arises: some possible configurations have the specified energy, while others are impossible because they do not. However, it turns out that it is frequently more appropriate to assume that all we know is the expected energy. Unfortunately, it questionable whether 9 An atom over Pi s an atom (as de fined ahove ) over the for mulas P1 (x). ... , Pk (x).
this is real ly an "objective" a-; sertion about the system in que. �tion,10 and in fac t the physicist<; encounter a problem analogous to that which motivated our paper. Like us, one response they have considered is to modify the assump tion of unifonn probability and move to maximum entropy (thus u sing, essentially, an instance of our CEW applied to a uniform prior). But another response is the fo llowing.
Physical ly, expected energy is appropriate for systems in thermal equilibrium (i .e . , at a constant temperature). But in practice this means Ulat Ule system is in Ulennal contact with a (generally much larger) system, sometimes called a heat bath. So another approach is to model the system of in terest a> being part of a much larger system, including the heat bath, whose total energy is truly fixed. On Ulis larger scale, random-worlds is once again applicable. By choosing the energy for the total system appropriately, Ule expected energy of the smal l subsystem will be as speci fi ed . Hence. we have converted subjective statements into objective ones, so that we are able to use our standard tech niques. In this domain, there is a clear physical intuition for the connection between t11e objective infonnation (Ule energy of the heat bath) and the subjective infonnation (the expected energy of the small system).
A more recent, and q ui te di ffe ren t, appearance of Ulis intu ition is in the work of Paris and Vencovska [PV92) . They dell ned th eir method so that it ha<> the same restricted scope as the ME method. We present a more general version here, that can handle a somewhat richer set of knowledge bases. al though it s scope is still more restricted than CEF. It can deal with arbitrary inference processes, but Ule knowl edge hase must have the form KB 1\ BE, where KB is objective and DB is an essentially propositional belief base ahou t some constant c. The first step in the method is to transform 13 I3 int o an objective fo rmula. Let S be a new unary predicate, representing the set of individuals ·�ust like c". We transform BD to KBnn by replacing all tenus of the fo rm Pr(1/J( c)ID(c)) by 111/ !(x) IB(x) 1\ S(x)ll:t-. and replacing all occmTences of ::; by �. We then add Ule cnnjuncts IIS( :rlll, :::: : 0 <md S(c), since S is assumed to he a small set and c must be in S. I t is almost immediate from the defini tions that if BB is a simple belief base ahout c, then RS(Pr,:)(<p(c)IKB A DB) = limr -o limN-= RS(Pr;r)(<piKB). We abbrevi ate RS( Prr;;: ) as Pr� .
In general, RS and CEF are distinct. This observa tion fo llows from results of [PV92) concerning an infer ence process CM, showing that RS(CM) cannot be equal to CEF( CM ). On the other hand, Uley show Ulat, in the restricted setting in which ME applies, RS(ME) CEF(ME). Since ME = Pt� in this set ting, we have:
if'lf it is objective. it is most plausibly a statement about the average energy over time. While this is a reasonable viewpoint, it does not really escape fro m philosophical or technical problems either.
Theorem 3.9: If KB is a simple knowledge base about c, BB is an essentially propositional knowledge base about c, and tf; is an essentially propositionalformula, then CEF(rc:)(<p(c)IKB /\ BB) "" CEF(ME) (<p(c) !KB II BB) = RS(ME)(<p(c) !KB II BB) = Pr�(<p(c) IKB II BB).
Discussion
We have presented three methods for extending inference processes so that they can deal with degrees of belief. We view the fac t that the three methods essentially agree when applied to the random-worlds method a� evidence validat ing their result as the "appropriate" extension of random worlds.
Since our fo cus was on extending the random-worlds method here, there were many issues th at we were not able to investigate thoroughly. We mention two of the more significant ones here:
• Our definitions of CEF �Uld RS a;; su me cert ain restric tions on the form of the kn owledge base, which are not assumed in CEW. Is it possible to ex tend these methods so that they apply to more gen eral knowledge bases? In this context, it is worth not ing that RS ha� 4uitc a dif ferent flavor from the other two approaches. Tt1e basic idea involved seems to be to ask "What objec!ive fa cts might there be to cause one to have the belicl"s in I3 B ·)".
Given an answer to this, we add these fa cts to KB in l ieu of BB; we can U1en app ly whatever in fe rence process we choose. We do not see m1y philosophical reason that prevents appl ication of U1is idea in wider co ntexts than belief bases about some constant c. The technical prob lems we have fo und trying to do this seem dirtlcult but not deep or intractable.
• We have essentially a.;; sumed what might be viewed as concurrent rather U1ru1 sequential updat ing here. Sup pose our knowledge base contai ns two constraints:
Pr(<pt ) = u1 1\ Pr(<p2 ) = o·2 · Although we cannot usu ally apply Jeffrey's rule to such a conjunction, we can ap ply the rule seq uentially, first updating by Pr( <p1 ) = n 1, and then by Pr( <p2) = et2• We have described our meth ods in ilie context of updating by any set of constraints at once, but they can also be defined to update by con straints one at a time. 
